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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

Insurance-Company Liability For Wrongful Death
When Insured Murdered By Purchaser Wi:th
No Insurable In:teres:t
Three insurance companies negligently issued policies on the
life of a two-year-old child to an aunt-in-law having no insurable interest in the child's life. A few months later, the aunt
murdered the child. 1 Plaintiff, the child's father, recovered a
$75,000 judgment against the insurance companies for his child's
wrongful death. Held: Judgment affirmed. The central reason
for refusing to recognize insurance contracts where the beneficiary has no insurable interest is that such contracts provide
a motive for murder. Hence an insurance company must use
reasonable care not to issue a life insurance policy to one with
no insurable interest and murder oJ the insured by the "no insurable interest" beneficiary may accordingly be found to be a
foreseeable consequence of failing to exercise such care. - Liberty
Life Insurance Company v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696
(1957).
The court's reliance on the law of insurance to support its
holding on foreseeability seems misplaced. While statements can
be found to the effect that the law of insurable interests is to
some extent premised on a "temptation to murder" rationale, 2
certainly its central basis is not temptation to murder but the
public policy against gambling. This is evident not only from

l

Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So.2d 552 (1953) affirmed conviction of the aunt for murder.

2

Helmetag's Admr'x v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1874).
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the many holdings that insurance policies are freely assignable3
but from judicial approval of other interests involving tendencies quite as fatal to human life-life-tenant-remainderman and
testator-legatee relationships, 4 for example. An illustrative case
is Chamberlain v. Butler.5 The Nebraska C-0urt, in response fo
the argument that insurance policies may not be assigned to
strangers because this would create a temptation to murder and
holding insurance policies to be freely assignable stated as follows:
. . . the same desire would exist on the part of a creditor who
has an insurable interest, or of one who had advanced money on
the policy, where his only hope of reimbursing himself for the
loan might be the policy. It is exceedingly doubtful if strangers
are anY more apt to either desire to seek to accomplish the death
of others than are those nearly related to them.6

Probably the holding should be viewed as merely another
illustration of the modern judicial tendency towards expansion
of the traditional proximate cause doctrine. Weldon7 seems quite
irreconcilable with traditional cases such as Palsgraf8 where the
falling of the scale was held to be a non-foreseeable consequence
of pushing the firecracker-laden passenger. The expansion of
proximate cause, illustrated by W eldon9 is likewise discernable
in several other recent cases. In Genovay v. Fox, 10 for example,
the court held a proprietor of a bowling alley-bar liable when
the plaintiff was shot and wounded by a gunman who had been
jumped by another patron while robbing the defendant's place
of business. The court stated that the proprietor was under a
duty to conduct himself so as to avoid inducing or encouraging
resistance to the bandit if resistance reasonably appeared to entail an increased risk of serious injury or death to those present. 11
a Murphy v. Reid, 64 Miss. 614, 1 So. 761 (1887), Chamberlain v. Butler,
61 Neb. 730, 86 N.W. 48 (1901), Bray v. Malcolm, 194 Ga. 593, 22 So.2d
126 (1942), Butterworth v. Missouri Valley Trust Co., 62 Mo. 133, 240
S.W.2d 676 (1951).
4 Murphy v. Reid, 64 Miss. 614, 1 So. 761 (1887), Clark v. Allen, 11 R.I.
439 (1877).
0 61 Neb. 730, 86 N.W. 481 (1901).
6 Id., at 738, 482.
7 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696 (1957).
s Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
9 Supra, note 7.
lo 50 N.J.Super. 598, 143 A.2d 229 (1958).
11 The court found that the defendant intended to communicate to others
present in the room, the availability of a concerted attack on the gun-
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That Genovay 12 is itself an expansion of the traditional proximate cause holdings may be seen by reference to such cases as
Noll v. Marian. 13 Plaintiff in Noll, a depositor in defendant's
bank, was denied recovery when shot as a result of refusal by
defendant's teller to obey a bandit's command not to move.
This is not to suggest however, that traditional cause notions are everywhere being extended. For example, in Helms
v. Harris,1 4 on similar facts, plaintiff was denied recovery when
shot as the result of the defendant's wrestling with the gµnman
for possession of his revolver.
In conclusion, the instant case 15 seems unrealistic on its reliance on a supposed temptation to murder rationale of the law
of insurable interests and is supportable, if at all, only in terms
of the most recent foreseeability developments.

Richard E. Petrie '60

12
13

14
1i;

man by failing to open the safe on the first try, by placing the money
across the room from the bandit, and by suggesting that the gunman
take the remaining cash from the safe himself.
Supra, note 10.
347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943).
281 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955).
Supra, note 7.

